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CHAPTER 
13 Social Comparison and Persuasion Processes in Health Communications 
Jerry Suls and Kathryn Bruchmann 
Abstract 
Two basic social processes, persuasion and social comparison, have figured prominently in the 
development and implementation of health communications since the early 1950s. This chapter 
reviews relevant theory and evidence from basic persuasion and comparison research to demonstrate 
the centrality of the self-concept for understanding changes in personal belief, opinion, self-efficacy, 
and behavior change. Then, selective evidence and implications from health communications research 
are reviewed: Interventions using self-affirmation; gain-loss framing and graphic warning labels/fear 
appeals from the persuasion area; and interventions using normative provision, social comparison 
interventions, and support groups from the comparison area. In the final section, personalized, 
tailored health-communication approaches that capitalize on both persuasion and comparison 
paradigms are described. For intervention and public-policy purposes, it is recommended that 
communications that increase personal relevance, cognitive elaboration, and assimilation to health 
role-models have the strongest potential for creating lasting health behavior change. 
Key Words: social comparison, persuasion, elaboration likelihood, self-affirmation, gain-loss framing, 
proxy model, self-efficacy, tailored communications, fear appeals 
In health communications, people are urged 
co engage in physical exercise, maintain nutritious 
and appropriately sized diets, obtain inoculations, 
avoid cigarettes, undergo screening procedures and 
take recommended medications. In the_early 1950s, 
social psychologists, whose specialties were in atti-
tude measurement and persuasion, were among the 
first behavioral scientists to consider the best ways to 
design and disseminate health communications to 
inform and persuade the public to adopt healthy-
and avoid unhealthy-practices. As basic social psy-
chology has adv~nced, its contributions to health 
communication also have expanded. Additionally, 
the means by which health messages are communi-
cated have grown from just face-to-face, magazines, 
newspapers, billboards, or radio to include televi-
sion, social media, and the Internet. 
This chapter describes how knowledge about 
basic social psychological processes has informed 
the development and application of effective health 
communications. The coverage will be selective and 
focus mainly on two core social psychological areas 
that frequently work in tandem: persuasion and 
social comparison processes. 
Defining Terms and 
Describing Overlap 
Persuasion refers to the process whereby written 
or spoken words are used to communicate informa-
tion, feelings, and/or reasoning toward some event, 
idea, object, or other person(s) (Sei rer & Gass, 
201 O). Pacts, argumenrs, and testimonials are used 
to sway opinion. Social comparison is defined as the 
process of thinking about information about one or 
more other people in relation to the self. Relative 
standing can be informative about what one is capa-
ble of doing and whether one's personal opinions 
and beliefs are correct (Festinger, 19 54a&b; Wood, 
1996). 1he comparison process is assumed t~ oper-
ate mainly when people do not have objective 
information available to gauge their standing and 
uncertainty is high (cf. Klein, 1997). Comparison 
can be a deliberative process, but it can also occur 
unconsciously or implicitly. Persuasion arid com-
parison are usually treated as distinct processes, but 
they need not be. 
One common scenario that combines persua-
sion and comparison occurs when one learns the 
results of an opinion poll, overhears someone state 
his or her view, or infers another person's opinion 
from overt behavior. Under these circumstances, it 
would be surprising that comparison of one's per-
sonal views with another person would not occur, 
at least implicitly. Even in the absence of supporting 
information or arguments, mere exposure to anoth-
er's person position on some issue may be sufficient 
to induce attitude change, or, if one learns one's 
opinion is shared, bolster confidence. Persuasion, 
on the other hand, involves not just learning about 
some person, group, or organization's opinion (i.e., 
level of agreement or disagreement), but also being 
exposed to facts and arguments that sustain their 
position. 
Comparison may be integrally connected to 
persuasion when the communication source's rela-
tive standing with the target audience on relevant 
attributes is salient. For example, while listening to 
a political appeal, a message is generally more per-
suasive when it comes from someone of the same 
political party (e.g., Brock, 1965). Similarly, a com-
mon assumption is that a persuasive message from 
a person who is similar to the audience in gender, 
age, or life experience, lends credibility to the con-
tent of the communication. These examples provide 
a preliminary illustration of the interconnected-
ness of persuasion and social comparison. This is 
a common occurrence in health communications, 
although, in some cases, the social comparison ele-
ments are implicit and unacknowledged. This chap-
ter will further parse the relationships between these 
theories in health communications. 
Lessons from Persuasion 
In the earliest days of persuasion research, attitude 
change was conceptualized in terms of learning the-
ory or information processing. 1he Yale approach, 
led by Carl Hovland, proposed that persuasion is 
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contingent on a sequence of stages: attention, corn-
prehension, learning, acceptance, and retention of 
the information in a communication (Hovland 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953). A persuasive appeal is sue~ 
cessful to the extent that the message and its con-
clusion were attended to, understood, accepted, and 
later recalled (McGuire, 1968). 
Laboratory-based research involved testing 
manipulations thought to be relevant for particular 
information processing stages. For example, source 
credibility can be relevant to all stages, whereas 
comprehension seems especially affected by the 
complexity of the message. Health communicators 
initially adopted manipulations found to be success-
ful in laboratory research, such as source credibility 
and incentives for adopting recomm~ndations. 
One type of incentive, based on fear-based con-
ditioning, was borrowed from learning theory. 
Fear was conceptualized as a drive state motivating 
trial-and-error behavior to reduce the drive (e.g. , 
Janis, 1967). In persuasion, fear arousal was pre-
sumed to enhance message acceptance when the 
message also prompts mental rehearsal of the rec-
ommended precaution that reduces the fear Ganis, 
1967). For example, a campaign might provoke fear 
by describing a threat to which the target is suscepti-
ble (e.g., depictions of serious automobile accidents), 
followed by description of safety conditions pro-
duced by protective action (e.g., "always buckle-up 
to reduce the risk of serious injury"). In amended 
form, this idea is the basis for contemporary public 
campaigns in Europe and the United States featur-
ing graphic warning labels on cigarette packs (e.g., 
Hassan, Shiu, Thrasher, Fong & Hastings, 2008), 
which will be discussed in more detall late'r. 
Although attitude change conceived as a learn-
ing phenomenon was the foundation for extensive 
research and provided supportive evidence for the 
use of several persuasion strategies, the approach 
had limitations. Researchers studying fear-based 
appeals found that high levels of fear may instigate 
defensive processes, such as derogation of the com-
munication source or denial of the message content, 
and thereby often were ineffective. Fear was effective 
only when the audit:nce had a viable and available 
plan or strategy to control the danger (Leventhal, 
Singer, and Jones, 1965). 
Notably; the premise of the Yale approach char 
persuasion produces new learning was not strongly 
supported. For example, the amount of information 
presented in the persuasive message that the target 
can recall tends to be poorly correl~ted with degree 
of attitude change (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). 
f\lso , some influence targets attend and compre-
hend rhe message and change their minds, whereas 
ocher targets also attend and comprehend, but clo 
not change. These results do not provide strong 
support for the learning or information-processing 
framework. 
Among contemporary social psychologists, there 
is consensus that it is not merely the information 
that people attend to or comprehend but also what 
they cognitively "do" with the information that 
affects the degree to which persuasion occurs. In 
other words, persuasion depends on how the con-
tent of a persuasive message is cognitively processed, 
an insight that forms the basis of the influential 
elaboration-likelihood model of persuasion (ELM; 
Pet[)' & Cacioppo, 1981). For ELM, how moti-
vated and able people are· to assess the central merits 
of an issue or a position is the critical element. Some 
motivational and ability variables are part of the 
persuasion situation, whereas others are individual 
atrribuce ·. The more motivated and able people are 
to assess the merits of an issue or position, the more 
likely they are to effortfully scrutinize issue-relevant 
information. 
When elaboration likelihood is high, people will 
thoughtfully assess the communication in relation 
to knowledge that they already possess and arrive 
at a reasoned attitude that is well-articulated and 
bolstered by supporting information. Deliberative 
cognitive processing may elicit thoughts supportive 
of the message, but also be met with self-generated 
counterarguments. The predominance of support-
ive thoughts over counterarguments will determine 
whether the message is persuasive. This is consid-
ered the central route of persuasion. When elabo-
ration likelihood is low, information scrutiny is 
reduced and attitude change can result from less 
resource-demanding processes that do not require 
as much effortful evaluation; this is referred to as the 
peripheral route ofpmuasion. 
Attitudes that are changed by low (rather than 
high) effort are assumed to be weaker and have less 
impact on behavior than attitudes that are changed 
the same extent by high effort. Whereas high elabo-
ration may involve careful deliberation about the 
accuracy and reasonableness of the facts and argu-
ments presented in the message, low elaboration 
involves the use of peripheral cues; for example, 
simply counting the number of arguments and 
assuming that with "so many arguments, it must be 
good," or that if a physically attractive source advo-
cates the product, "it must be worth purchasing" 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
An important variable affecting an individual's 
motivation to "elaborate" is the perceived per-
sonal relevance or importance of the communica-
tion (Petry & Cacioppo, 1979; 1986; Johnson & 
Eagly, 1989). When the issue's personal relevance is 
high, people are more influenced by the substantive 
arguments in a message and are less impacted by 
peripheral cues, such as source attractiveness (e.g., 
Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). There also 
are individual differences in people's motivation 
to think about persuasive communications. Those 
who enjoy thinking are described as being high in 
"need for cognition"(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and 
tend to form attitudes on the basis of the quality of 
the arguments in a message rather than on periph-
eral cues (see Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). 
There is a long list of relevant persuasion variables 
identified by attitude researchers, such as source 
credibility, message complexity, and message repeti-
tion, but the persuasion topic's personal relevance 
appears to be the superordinate construct. Topic rel-
evance is defined by the self-concept-the personal 
attributes and issues an individual considers to be 
self-defining, the life domains that are most dear 
and desirable goals and aspirations. When a persua-
sive message has resonance for the self-system, then 
deliberative cognitive processes are set in motion. 
Fea1·-Appeals Redux 
Because threat or fear figures prominently in 
health communications, it may be worthwhile to 
consider the way current attitude researchers think 
about them. To anticipate our argument, the self also 
has a prominent role. Several reviewers observe that 
fear per se does not distinguish between effective and 
ineffective interventions (Fisher & Fisher, 1992). 
This may be because fear triggers two qualitatively 
different motivational processes (Leventhal, 1970). 
First is fear control, which involves reduction of a 
threat through derogation of the source and defen-
sive processes, such as denial. However, this kind of 
control does nothing to actually lessen the threat. 
Danger control, the second process, elicits cognitive 
processes to instigate protective actions to actually 
avoid the threat. Fear control and danger control 
can act independently or in tandem (Leventhal, 
1970). The protection-motivation model (Rogers, 
1975) posits that danger control consists of a threat 
apprai al component ("how serious and how per-
sonally susceprible am I") and a coping appraisal 
(assessment of effectiveness of potential responses 
[outcome expectancies] and personal ability to 
perform actions successfully) (Maddux & Rogers, 
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1983; Rogers, 1975; see also Witte, 1992; Witte & 
Allen, 2000). 
In the absence of feelings of outcome-efficacy 
and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986), threat induces 
fear control rather than precautionary behavior. 
However, with appropriate reassurance that there 
are actions that can prevent the dire event and the 
belief that one is capable of such actions, then pre-
cautionary behavior (i.e., danger control) should 
follow (Ruiter, Kok, Verplanken, & Brug, 2001). 
The role of susceptibility, outcome-efficacy and 
self-efficacy demonstrated in fear appeals dovetails 
with the more general idea that persuasion and 
behavior change require the engagement of the 
self-system. If the message recipient believes the 
personal susceptibility to injury or illness is negli-
gible, then the message has little personal relevance. 
If there is no potential precautionary action or if 
self-efficacy is perceived to be low, then the precau-
tionary action is unlikely. 
Attitudes and Behavior. ELM researchers have 
been most concerned with persuasion and atti-
tude change and less with the relationship between 
attitudes and behavior (the conspicuous exception 
being the idea that central processing is more likely 
to have greater impact on attitudes and subsequent 
behavior). The most influential explanation for the 
attitude-behavior relationship is Ajzen's Theory 
of Planned Action (TPA; Ajzen 2001; Ajzen & 
Fishbein 2005), which postulates that behavior 
follows from both behavioral intentions and per-
ceived control over behavior. Intentions are derived 
from considerations of attitudes, subjective norms 
(i.e., what relevant referent groups support), and 
perceived behavioral control (i.e., self-efficacy). 
A meta-analysis showed that intentions explained 
a significant portion of variance (18%) in subse-
quent behaviors, and subjective norms were the 
weakest predictor (13%) (Armitage & Conner, 
2001). Another meta-analysis found that inten-
tions only predicted 28% of the variance in actual 
behavior leaving much that is not accounted for; 
however, few studies have assessed actual behavior 
(Sheeran, 2002). 
An implicit assumption of .sume researchers is 
that the constructs in the TPA operate sequentially 
(with perceived control following the other con-
structs). However, concerns about poor outcomes 
or low self-efficacy may give rise to counterargu-
ments even during initial processing of a persuasive 
message. People often can quickly discern the impli-
cations of changing their opinions for suhsequent 
action. This means that assessing self-efficacy as low 
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while the persuasive message is cognitively processed 
may place the brakes on the ongoing elaboration of 
the message. This is consistent with the idea that 
there are several evaluative mechanisms that oper-
ate relatively independently (Giner-Sorolla, 1999; 
Ito & Cacioppo, 2001); the processing of attitude 
objects can occur at lower, more automatic levels, 
whereas higher-level processing can focus on other 
features of the attitude. Because there is a natural 
tendency to protect the self-system, the individual 
may automatically "move ahead" to questions, such 
as "am I capable to preventing this threat?" even 
before the entire message has been read or heard. 
If the individual perceives low self-efficacy, then 
processing of the message may be short-circuited by 
counterarguing with the message points and/ or der-
ogating the source. This means that outcome expec-
tancies and self-efficacy are relevant to virtually any 
persuasive message that has personal relevance-not 
just those eliciting fear. 
Lessons from Social Comparison 
Social comparisons can involve an unlimited 
range of domains, from personal income and physi-
cal attractiveness to physical health and political 
pre,ferences, but comparisons only have impact 
when they serve self-evaluation or self-enhancement. 
Self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954a&b) refers to peo-
ple's desire (a) to know what they are capable of 
doing (i.e., ability) and (b) to hold beliefs and values 
that are correct. Comparisons with peers, role mod-
els, and norms can provide such information. In the 
health domain, comparison provides information 
about medical risks, identifies behaviors that are 
health-promoting and health-damaging, and clari-
fies whether the individual has sufficient ability to 
perform the requisite behaviors. Self-enhancement 
refers to the desire to feel better or protect one-
self from the consequences of threatening infor-
mation (Wills, 1981; Wood, Taylor & Lichtman, 
1985). This motive is relevant to health because 
the occurrence or prospect of personal illness and 
its consequences are inherently threatening to the 
physical and psychological well-being of the self 
As described later, strategic inco(pomtion of social 
comparison information in healrh communica-
tions can buoy ·elf-esteem to facilitate the mar hal-
ing of personal L"C ·ources, coping, and adoption of 
health-promotive behaviors. 
Self-Evaluation 
For sel f-1.:valuation, comparison tends to be 
with someone who is similar to an individual on 
attributes related to and predictive of the dimen-
sion to be evaluated (referred to as related attributes). 
1hus, a patient gauging his or her physical health 
status should seek a comparison standard with 
paricnrs with the same disease, of rhe same age, 
uender, height, and weight and chose who engage 
" i_n imilar health practices. The pacienr ought to 
function about the same as this comparison stan-
dard, but if functioning better than the standard, 
the patient can infer better health. Comparing 
along related attribute dimensions allow us to get 
a better understanding of our personal situation 
(Goethals & Darley, 1977). 
Some times, however, people want to know more 
than simply that they are in good or poor health, but 
what they are capable of achieving ("Can I do X?). 
For example, chronic illness patients want to know 
whether they will get better or worse: "Can I return 
co my 40-hour a week job?" "Am I again able to 
play sports with my children or peers?" and so on. 
One way to answer such questions is to compare 
with someone-referred to as a proxy-who seems 
to have a similar level of ability and who has already 
succeeded at the task (Wheeler, Martin, & Suls, 
1997). If people have the same amount or more 
ability than the proxy does, they can conclude with 
some confidence that they could also do as well. 
There are two ways that people can be con-
fident that they have as much potential as the 
proxy: (a) they previously have fared as well as the 
proxy at his best, or (b) they observed how well 
the proxy is doing and are similar to the proxy on 
attributes related to their physical and psychologi-
cal well-being. In either scenario, they can establish 
with some certainty that they are similar in ability 
to the proxy and thus should have the same action 
possibilities. For example, finding a proxy who also 
has the same physical illness, about the same age, 
background, etc., and successfully returned to work 
a few weeks after hospital discharge. 
Questions about health status and chances of 
recovery are important, but laypeople and patients 
also have uncertainty about medical procedures, 
medications, and other health-related matters that 
can be answered via comparison. In opinion com-
parison, it is useful to distinguish between beliefs, 
which refer to verifiable facts, and values, which are 
personal preferences (Goethals & Darley, 1977). 
Whereas comparisons with similar others on related 
attributes, such as background and general world-
view, can serve for value assessment, someone who 
is dissimilar or, in particular, someone who is supe-
rior on related attributes (conferring more expertise) 
should be more informative about beliefs. Since few 
facts are completely value-free, someone who has 
more expertise and also shares the same basic values 
(i.e. , world view) is probably most preferred. Such a 
person can be considered as a "similar expert" (Suls, 
Martin & Wheeler, 2000). There is also a third type 
of opinion, which concerns predictions about sub-
jective responses to future situations (e.g., "Will 
I like my new physician?"). We can predict our 
likely future response to a new physician by learn-
ing about a proxy's response to the same physician 
if proxy shares related attributes or past pattern of 
agreement about medical doctors. 
Self-Enhancement, Contrast, 
and Assimilation 
The kinds of comparisons just described are 
driven by epistemic need, but as noted earlier, they 
also can be hedonically driven. A popular theory, 
downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981), pro-
posed that, under threat, people will prefer to com-
pare with others who are worse off to feel better 
about themselves. Subsequent research showed 
that medical patients, who presumably experience 
threat, seemed to benefit from downward compari-
sons (i.e., with patients worse-off) (Wood, Taylor & 
Lichtman, 1985). This was presumably because the 
contrast effect (i.e., displacement from a worse-off 
target) produced a positive change in feelings about 
the self (e.g. , Morse & Gergen, 1970). Conversely, if 
someone is exposed to an upward comparison (i.e., 
superior other), then feelings should be contrasted 
or displaced downward, and create worse feelings 
about one's standing (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). 
With the accumulation of more evidence, we 
know receipt of downward comparison does not 
always lead to positive feelings via contrast. In fact, 
we know that comparison also can lead to assimila-
tion, that is, displacement of feelings toward the tar-
get (e.g., Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992; 
Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen & Dakof, 1990; 
Collins, 1996; Suls, Martin & Wheeler, 2002). This 
means that there are four possible outcomes of social 
comparison: upward contrast (i.e., negative feelings 
from feeling different and inferior), upward assimi-
lation (i.e., positive because one may improve and 
become more like the comparison other), down-
ward contrast (i.e., positive because one is different 
and better than the other), and downward assimila-
tion (i.e., negative because one identifies with the 
inferior other and is concerned about faring poorly 
oneself). What factors determine which particular 
outcome follows social comparison? 
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The theory of selective accessibility (Mussweiler, 
2003), based on concepts from the social cogni-
tion literature, provides a plausible and coherent 
explanation. At the moment of exposure to a novel 
stimulus, people make rapid, holistic impressions 
based on salient features. In the comparison sce-
nario, a person makes a tentative and rapid judg-
ment of similarity or dissimilarity to the (superior 
or inferior) comparison target. Salient features 
(such as gender, race, or age) of the comparison 
target determine this initial impression. Then, the 
person searches for information consistent with the 
preliminary judgment (or hypothesis) of similarity 
or dissimilarity. Whether one searches for similar-
ity information or dissimilarity information, it is 
easy to find information that is consistent because 
self-concepts are remarkably rich and complicated. 
That information then becomes selectively acces-
sible when we make judgments about ourselves. 
If we have searched for information that we are 
similar to the standard, we are likely to assimi-
late our self-evaluations toward the target. If we 
have searched fo r information that we are dis-
similar to the target, we are likely to contrast our 
self-evaluations away from the target. 
Contrast is more likely if the standard is extreme 
or unattainable, or if the standard belongs to an 
out-group, both of which would lead to an initial 
hypothesis of dissimilarity. Assimilation is more 
likely to occur if there is psychological closeness with 
the standard, which would lead to a search for simi-
larity. The selective accessibility model (SAM) is ele-
gant and explains a wide variety of empirical results; 
however, a shortcoming of the model is that it does 
not explicitly recognize that self-enhancement or 
protection may bias comparisons. For example, 
there is abundant evidence that people assimilate 
upward, but there is almost no evidence of true 
downward assimilation (Wheeler & Suls, 2007). 
Although SAM would argue that upward and 
downward assimilation are equally likely, SAM 
could be modified slightly and state that one would 
not search for similarity with a downward standard 
because of self-esteem concerns; 
In brief, (1) relative standing is discerned with 
related attributes in mind, (2) estimating what one's 
potential (i.e ., self-efficacy) is depends on finding 
an appropriate proxy (similar in related attributes 
and already attempted "X"), and (3) assimilation/ 
contrast with upward or downward targets depends 
on the initial holistic impression of similarity/dis-
similarity that triggers cognitive processes, which 
tend to confirm the initial impression. 
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Health Communications Based on 
Persuasion Principles 
Persuasion theory and research indicate that 
a message needs to be personally relevant and in 
some way "self-defining," so as to engage elabo-
rative processing. At the same time, virtually all 
health messages create some threat that may raise 
personal concerns about response efficacy and 
self-efficacy and thereby encourage counterarguing, 
which may lower the effectiveness of the appeal. 
Researchers have used theory-based approaches to 
optimize processing but to minimize defensiveness 
of health communications. Three such approaches 
are described next. 
Self-Affirmation 
One strategy to increase receptiveness to 
potentially threatening health messages involves 
self-affirmation. This refers to the process whereby 
people are asked to reflect on their important values 
or cherished attributes, which is hypothesized to 
engage a more open-minded and balanced appraisal 
of threatening information (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006). In laboratory research, having participants 
self-affirm (e.g., describe why their most important 
values are relevant to their lives) counters effects 
of later performance failures or decisional regret 
(Steele, 1988). According to self-affirmation theo-
rists, self-defense involves general sense of self-worth; 
thus, affirming one aspect of the self can buffer a 
threat in a different domain (Blanton, Cooper, 
Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997). In the context of per-
suasive messages, self-affirmation should increase 
central-message processing (Correll, Spencer & 
Zanna, 2004), which would potentially produce 
more attitude and behavior change (assuming the 
influence target generates few counterarguments). 
Several successful applications of self-affirmation 
to health communications have been reported. 
Self-affirmation increased message acceptance and 
behavioral intentions and reduced denial about the 
self-relevance of health messages about skin can-
cer and sun safety (Jessop, Simmons, & Sparks, 
2009), safe sex, daily coffee consumption to pre-
vent fibrocystic breast disease (Crocker, Niiya, & 
Mischkowski, 2008), seafood consumption (Griffin 
& Harris, 2011), smoking reduction (Harris, Mayle, 
Mabbott, & Napper, 2007), heavy drinking (Napper, 
Harris & Epton, 2009), and HIV risk (Sherman, 
Nelson, & Steele, 2000). There also is evidence 
that self-affirmation can undo the negative effects 
of unrealistic optimism on colorectal cancer screen-
ing intentions (Klein et al., 2010). Although some 
srudie involve conveniencce (college-student) sam-
ples, community residents also have been recruited 
and similar benefits of self-afFil'mation obtained. 
A limitation concerns a paucity of results dem-
onsrrating an effect of self-affirmation on actual 
behavior change. An exception (Epton & Harris, 
2008) collected a baseline measure of fruit and 
vegetable consumption and then assigned women 
in rhe United Kingdom to a self-affirmation 
rnanipulation (versus control: opinions on unre-
lated issues) prior to reading a message about the 
health-promotive effects of increased consumption 
of fruits and vegetables. Behavior was assessed by 
having participants subsequently complete a 7 -day 
diary concerning fruit and vegetable consumption. 
Measures of response efficacy and self-efficacy were 
also collected. Results showed that self-affirmed 
participants consumed 5.5 portion more than the 
conrrol group (i.e., more than one day's worth of 
fruits and vegetables). Although self-affirmation was 
associated with increases in response efficacy (i.e., 
eating more fruits and vegetables will improve my 
health) and self-efficacy (i.e., "I can eat at least 5 
portions each day"), only changes in response effi-
cacy mediated the improvements in consumption. 
These results indicate that self-affirmation has 
che potential to enhance persuasive appeals. There 
is a need, however, to extend the range of health 
behaviors tested and to clarify whether and how 
self-efficacy can contribute to health-behavior 
change. 
Gain and Loss Framing 
According to prospect theory from decision-
science (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), whether 
a health message is framed in terms of gains or 
losses has consequences for changing attitudes and 
behavior (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). For exam-
ple, Mano, Sherman, and Updegraff (2004) used 
the following gain-framed message: "Flossing your 
teeth daily removes particles of food in the mouth, 
avoiding bacteria, which promotes great breath." 
The loss frame was, "If you do not floss your teeth 
daily, particles of food remain in the mouth, collect-
ing ba.cteria, which causes bad breath." According 
to decision science, people tend to be risk averse 
when a behavior involves a potential loss, but risk 
preferring when a behavior involves a potential 
gain. A behavior is considered to be a risky or safe 
course of action depending on the extent to which 
people perceive the behavior will lead to unpleas-
ant consequences. Choosing to perform a detection 
behavior, such as a colonoscopy, can be perceived as 
risky because test results carry a risk of getting bad 
news. On the other hand, choosing to take preven-
tive action (e.g., flossing) has little risk and affords a 
future of dental health. 
Extending this reasoning, Rothman and Salovey 
(1997) predicted that gain-framed health com-
munications are more effective for instigating 
illness-prevention behaviors, whereas loss-framed 
messages are more effective for detection behaviors. 
A large literature has tested these hypotheses in com-
munity and convenience samples (see Meyerowitz 
& Chaiken, 1987; Rothman, Wlaschin, Bartels, 
Latimer, & Salovey, 2008; Schneider et al., 2001). 
A recent meta-analysis (Gallagher & Updegraff, 
2012) of 94 experiments found gain-framed mes-
sages were more likely to encourage prevention 
behaviors (r = .08), especially with regard to smok-
ing cessation, physical activity, and skin cancer 
prevention-consistent with the prediction about 
prevention behavior. Loss- versus gain-framed mes-
sages, however, had similar effects on detection 
behaviors, which is not supportive of the compan-
ion hypothesis. Oddly, there also were no effects on 
attitudes or intentions for either kind of frame. 
The weak and null findings may be because some 
health issues engender different degrees of involve-
ment across individuals. For example, cancer risks 
of sun exposure should be more important for peo-
ple who work outside than for those who work in an 
office all day. For the latter persons, their low level 
of involvement should not elicit feelings of personal 
relevance, and, therefore, produce little message 
elaboration. Indeed, experiments manipulating high 
versus low issue involvement find stronger evidence 
for predictions about the effects of gain versus loss 
messages on detection versus prevention when high 
involvement is created (Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, 
Pronin, & Rothman, 1999; Banks et al., 1995). 
Another factor concerns how people construe 
health behaviors as potentially yielding a pleasant 
or an unpleasant outcome (Rothman et al., 2008). 
In the case of most medical screening procedures, 
the prospect of potentially bad news looms large, 
so loss-framed messages have the persuasive advan-
tage. Th::it, however, need not be the case. Users of 
university health services were more persuaded by 
a gain-framed message recommending a test for an 
enzyme described as detecting a health benefit, bur 
users were more persuaded by a loss-framed message 
when the enzyme was described as a health prob-
lem (Bartels, Kelly, & Rothman, 2010). In sum, 
health communicators need to be attentive to levels 
of issue involvement and to how people construe 
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health behaviors to elicit the distinctive effects of 
gain- and loss-framed messages. 
A third factor related to the effects of gain- and 
loss-frame messages concerns the degree to which 
the individuals are dispositionally oriented toward 
approach motivation, which is analogous to promo-
tion, versus oriented toward avoidance motivation, 
which is analogous to prevention (Higgins, 1999; 
Elliot & Thrash, 2002). For instance, people may 
increase their physical exercise either because they 
want to improve their health (representing approach 
orientation), or to avoid becoming overweight (rep-
resenting avoidance orientation). As in previous 
sections, the self-concept is relevant because these 
different motivations reflect the "desired self" versus 
the "feared self." This leads to a matching hypoth-
esis, that persuasion and behavior change should be 
maximal when the person's motivational orientation 
matches the message frame. 
Consistent with the matching hypothesis, per-
sons with dispositional approach motivations were 
more persuaded by a gain-framed communication 
about dental flossing or physical exercise, whereas 
those with avoidance motivations were more per-
suaded by loss-frame communication (Mann et al., 
2004; Latimer, et al., 2008). 
This research also has cultural implications for the 
effectiveness of health communications in an increas-
ingly diverse society. Individualistic cultures, such as 
the United States and most European countries, are 
said to emphasize promotion and sensitivity to posi-
tive outcomes; whereas collectivistic cultures, such 
as Asian countries, emphasize prevention and sensi-
tivity to negative outcomes (Lee, Aaker & Gardner, 
2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This translates 
to predicting that communicating potential gains or 
benefits of a health behavior should be more effec-
tive for persons in individualistic societies. However, 
a loss frame should work better in collectivistic cul-
tures at encouraging behavior changes. These pre-
dictions have received support in the areas of dental 
hygiene (Uskul, Sherman & Fitzgibbon, 2009) and 
caffeine consumption (Uskul & Oyserman, 2010). 
Fear Appeals and Graphic 
Wttniing Labels 
Due to the concerns about eliciting denial or 
defensiveness found in research, public health offi-
cials in the United States have tended not to utilize 
graphic depictions of the effects of illness or risk 
behaviors to the degree that was popular in earlier 
decades. There is one area of public health, however, 
where graphic images have been advocated-on 
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cigarette-pack warning labels. Since 1960, the 
federal government has instituted warning labels, 
including statements, such as: "Caution: Cigarette 
Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health," or 
"Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking Causes 
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May 
Complicate Pregnancy." In Canada, Australia, and 
some European countries, however, recent govern-
ment regulations require larger and more specific 
warnings (e.g., "Cigarettes cause lung cancer. 85% 
of lung cancers are caused by smoking and 80% of 
lung cancer victims die within three years."), accom-
panied by images, such as a picrure of a human lung 
detailing cancerous growths. Lobbying by health 
organizations encouraged the passage of the U.S. 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act of 2009, which requires color graphics with 
supplemental text that depicts the negative conse-
quences of smoking to cover 50% of the front and 
rear of each pack. Currently, this directive is being 
challenged in the courts with tobacco companies 
claiming the new regulations infringe on their right 
to free speech. 
There is much evidence favoring the use of 
graphic warning levels (e.g., Borland, & Hill, 
1997) and results continue to be released from the 
International Tobacco Control Four Country Survey 
Study conducted since 2002 (Canada, Australia, 
United Kingdom and United States) to evaluate 
the effects. Most of the available evidence indicates 
that exposure to graphic labels leads to enhanced 
knowledge about smoking risks and increased inter-
est in quitting (e.g., Li , Borland, Yong et al., 2012). 
A panel study conducted in Canada demonstrated 
that smokers who had read, thought about, and dis-
cussed the new labels at baseline were more likely 
to have quit, made a quit attempt, or reduced their 
smoking three months later (Hammond, Fong, 
McDonald, Cameron, & Brown, 2003). 
These results seem to contradict the earlier 
research suggesting that high fear is ineffective unless 
people also perceive they have resource options and 
self-efficacy. However, graphic warning labels have 
an advantage that billboards and media messages 
do not-smokers invariably see the gory imagery 
every time they take a cigarette out of its pack. Also, 
the public health community in Canada may have 
promored cessation aids so widely, in combi.narion 
with the graphic labels that people a.re succes ful at 
quitting. Alternatively: perhaps smokers who intend 
ro quir are likely to pay arrenrion co the .labels, 
although the prospective associations do not favor 
this explanation (Hammond et al., 2003). 
For the purpose of balance, quitting and quitting 
permanent& are quite different; relapse in 3-6 months 
is common, so the long-term benefits of graphic 
warnings await further confirmation. Nonetheless, 
research on self-quitters shows that after two or three 
attempts, many smokers acquire sufficient knowl-
edge and skills to give up the habit permanently 
(Schachter, 1982, cf. Cohen et al., 1989). Another 
reservation is that some people tend to question the 
authenticity of the imagery in warnings and assume 
the images have deliberately been distorted, which is 
suggestive of denial or defensiveness described earlier 
(McCool, Webb, Cameron, & Hoek, 2012). 
1hese concerns lead us to conclude that graphic 
warning labels should be most effective if they also 
provided information about how to contact a tele-
phone quit line that offers concrete strategies and 
assistance in quitting and resisting relapse. In this 
way, threat can be handled by providing reassurance 
about response options and personal self-efficacy. 
Fear and Framing. Some researchers (Cameron & 
Chan, 2008) have advanced the idea that fear arousal 
should enhance the impact of loss-framed messages 
but detract from gain-framed messages. The pre-
diction about fear and loss framing has been tested 
and confirmed by Gerend and Maner (2011). 1hese 
researchers proposed that people should be more 
motivated to adhere to behavior change recommen-
dations if they receive a message consistent with their 
current motivational state. Consequently, inducing 
fear, with its concomitant focus on risk and threat, 
should produce more responsiveness to a loss-framed 
message. In their study, undergraduates completed a 
baseline assessment of fruit and vegetable imake fol-
lowed by an emotion-induction task. Then they read 
a gain- or loss-framed pamphlet promoting more 
fruits and vegetable and provided tips about how to 
implement the recommendations. Then, two-weeks 
later, participants completed another assessment of 
fruit and vegetable consumption. Those who had 
received a fear induction showed more adherence 
to the recommendations communicated with a loss 
frame. Interestingly, inducing a different type of 
negative emotion, anger, did not have this effect (see 
Gerend & Maner, 2011 ). 
Empirical Evidence on Health 
Communication Based on Social 
Comparison 
Social-Norm Campaigns 
There have been several ways that the power of 
social comparisons has been harnessed by health 
communications to recalibrate norms and standards 
related to health and motivated behavior change. 
One method capitalizes on how comparisons con-
cerning relative standing with peers provide infor-
mation about appropriate beliefs and practices. 
Surveys and interviews with community-residing 
adults demonstrate that people worry and act on 
their level of personal risk when they believe or are 
informed they are at higher risk than their peers 
(Dillard, McCaul, Kelso, & Klein, 2006; Lipkus & 
Klein, 2006). In one such study (Lipkus & Klein, 
2006), community residents were recruited and 
stratified to high- and low-risk groups for colorec-
tal cancer, based on the presence or absence of 
actual risk factors. They also were informed that 
they had more than the average number of risk fac-
tors of a group of 100 other people also tested or 
they received no risk information. Those informed 
they were higher in comparative risk had the high-
est intentions and were more likely to undergo 
colorectal screening. Of note, recent websites that 
are designed to provide people with information 
about their disease risk in order to promote behav-
ior change (e.g., Your Disease Risk website (http:// 
www.yourdiseaserisk.wustl.edu/) have chosen to 
provide feedback in a comparative framework. 
Besides campaigns that communicate health risks, 
it has become a common practice to provide social 
norms about health behavior practices, such as alco-
hol consumption and smoking (Perkins, 2002). The 
premise is chat the public often overestimates the 
prevalence of unhealthful practices, such as prob-
lem eating or problem drinking, because just a few 
extreme episodes are so memorable and thereby 
distort the perceived norm about how most people 
behave (Suls & Green, 2003; Bourgeosie & Bowen, 
2001). Campaigns providing actual behavioral norms 
to correct norm estimates to discourage unhealthy 
practices (e.g., Agostinelli, Brown, & Miller, 1995) 
have had some success. However, the extent to which 
wide-scale dissemination of norms can successfully 
inculcate healthier practices is unknown. Whereas 
bingers might reduce their drinking to behave more 
like the "average," people who are temperate, upon 
learning the "norm," may shift to become less tem-
perate (Hansen & Graham, 1991; Schultz, Nolan, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). In other 
words, providing norms in community campaigns 
might actually backfire for some persons. 
Health Communications Using 
Comparison with Patients 
In medical settings, it is not uncommon 
for patients with acute or chronic illness to be 
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exposed to health communications that involve 
social comparisons. Prior or following surgery, 
patients may be asked to view videotapes depict-
ing the procedure and its sequelae and what prac-
tices should be followed postdischarge. Often, 
these videotapes feature real patients or actors 
posing as patients who describe their experiences. 
More informal health communications may be 
transmi teed in patient support groups where 
some comparisons may be implicit and explicit. 
Theory and laboratory research described earlier 
has been applied to coping in acute and chronic 
illness patients. 
Whether comparisons are associated with better 
or worse responses depends, in part, on how patients 
construe their likelihood of improvement or decline 
(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; see also Mussweiler, 
2003). If people perceive they can improve, they 
cognitively search for similarities with a patient who 
is better off, leading to upward assimilation . If they 
do not believe they are capable of improvement, 
they search for differences with the fortunate tar-
get, leading to downward contrast. If people think 
they may become worse, then they will search for 
similarities with a less fortunate patient, resulting in 
downward assimilation. Finally, if they think they 
can get better, then they should search for differ-
ences with the less fortunate, producing upward 
contrast. Experimental studies tend to support 
these predictions with one exception: Downward 
assimilation is rarely seen (Wheeler & Suls, 2007) , 
probably because most people are highly motivated 
to avoid thinking about the prospect of getting 
worse so motivation trumps belief about a possible 
decline . 
Some people, however, may be temperamentally 
inclined to be optimistic or pessimistic. Cancer 
patients who score high in neuroticism respond 
unfavorably to learning about both more and less 
fortunate patients (Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, 
& Bos, 1998). Because neurotics tend to have a neg-
ative outlook, including low expectations about the 
future, their poorer responses to any kind of com-
parison is understandable . 
An illustrative study found most patients 
try to make the best of comparisons (Stanton, 
Danoff-Burg, Cameron, Snider, & Kirk, 1999). 
Breast cancer patients listened to an interview with 
a (supposed) patient whose comments reflected 
good, poor, or unspecified psychological and physi-
cal status. Listening to the poorly adjusted patient 
led to higher self-ratings of adjustment than listen-
ing to a well-adjusted patient, although even the 
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latter group rated adjustment and prognosis as bet-
ter than char described by the patient in the inter-
view. There were apparent benefits from exposure 
to better off or worse off patients, but assimilation 
with a less fortunate patient was resisted. 
A recent, comprehensive review (Arigo, Suls & 
Smyth, 2012) found that exposure to better-off 
patients produces more favorable outcomes than to 
worse-off patients. However, rarely does a better-o ff 
patient produce significantly better moods or 
self-efficacy than exposure to a neutral control 
condition. We think the reason is connected to 
considerations described earlier about basic com-
parison processes: Assimilation to someone of 
higher standing (or lower standing) requires an ini-
tial impression of similarity to facilitate more elabo-
rate search for additional similarities (Mussweiler, 
2003). Typically, in past studies exposing patients 
to high-functioning comparison vignettes, there has 
been no attempt to highlight similarities beyond 
gender and age. To encourage patients to find more 
similarity with the target, it probably is essential to 
optimally match the patient's attributes and pref-
erences with the target. Following the logic of the 
proxy theory and selective-accessibility theory, com-
parison models should be tailored co the patient's 
attributes to optimize the opportunity for upward 
assimilation. 
One implication is that, as audiovisual record-
ings of patient models in psycho-educational inter-
ventions increasingly are being used to prepare 
patients for medical procedures (Mahler & Kulik, 
1998), they need to be developed with careful atten-
tion to factors identified in experimental research, 
such as similarities to the target and perceived 
attainment. At the same time, basic research show-
ing that highly neurotic patients may compare 
indiscriminately indicates such persons may need 
special interventions to counteract their generally 
negative expectations. 
Support Groups. Health information also is 
communicated in Internet chat-rooms and patient 
support groups-settings in which social com-
parisons play an important role (Carmack-Taylor 
et al., 2007; Bunde et al., 2006) . In conventional 
support groups, patients with a particular dis-
ease are recruited, so groups are heterogeneous in 
terms of distress level and disease severity. The seg-
ment of well-adjusted patients may have no need 
for support, but may be included to serve as role 
models and targets of positive assimilation, con-
sistent with the theory and lab studies described 
earlier. 
Combining Persuasion 
and Comparison in Health 
Communications 
TailoredMessages 
Although the role of comparison processes is 
not always explicitly acknowledged, personalized 
cailored health communications, a relatively recent 
development, engage both persuasion and com-
paris·on processes. In the majority of past programs 
involving health communicarions, the materials 
consist of a " ... single, generalized body of infor-
mation in the form of brochures, booklets or pam-
phlets designed for the general population or for 
some demographic subgroup," (Kreuter, Streoher, 
& Glassman, 1999, p. 276). With the introduction 
of new computer technologies, persuasive messages 
can be quickly tailored to a target's attributes, needs, 
and interests. The latter personal information may, 
in some cases, be available in medical records, but 
a person's status can be self-administered, assessed 
by interview or administered by an interactive com-
puter program. For example, to create a personal-
ized tailored appeal for diet change, information is 
collected about age, gender, current diet, cooking 
ski lls and eating patterns (Kreuter, Bull, C lark, & 
Oswald, 1999) . Personalized tailored materials can 
capitalize on personal relevance, which, in turn, 
prompts elaborative cognitive processes (Petry & 
Cacioppo, 1981). 
Further, such tailoring should facilitate the kind 
of assimilative processing described in the proxy and 
selective accessibility accounts of social comparison. 
Even if the health communication presents facts and 
arguments advocating change and behavioral strate-
gies without providing a role model or testimonial 
(from a real or fictitious person), the communica-
tion represents a viewpoint concerning relevant 
beliefs, values, and behaviors that constitute a kind 
of social comparison with an "idea" of a comparison 
target. Thus, value, belief, and preference-prediction 
comparison processes should be engaged, particu-
larly when the informatio n matches the recipient's 
personal attributes and current standing. The com-
bination of assimilation promoted by elaboration 
and comparison should optimize persuasion. 
Several empirical studies offer support for these 
ideas (Bull , Kreuter, & Scharff, 1999; Kreuter et al., 
1999; Holt, Clark, Kreuter, & Scharff, 2000; Brug, 
Steenhaus, Van Assema, & De Vries, 1996) . For 
example, adult primary-care patients were randomly 
assigned to receive personalized tailored materials 
to increase their physical activity (matched to the 
patients' goals, types of acrivities and perceived 
barriers) or to receive unpersonalized generic mate-
rials. The group receiving th e personalized tailored 
communication showed larger increases in physical 
activity (Bull et al., 1999). Other evidence confirms 
that such messages elicit greater interest, more posi-
tive self-assertions and more positive thoughts about 
behavior change intentions (Skinner, Campbell, 
Rimer, Curry, & Prochaska, 1999) than more 
generic, mass-produced materials. 
Narrative Communication 
A second way in which comparison and persua-
sion processes can be engaged is in narrative health 
communications. The health messages described 
in earlier sections of this chapter involve statisti-
cal evidence, probability and appeals to reason-
sometimes referred to as expository communication. 
The ELM is thought to be the appropriate model 
for such messages. An alternative form is narra-
tive communication, which employs storytelling 
and testimonials, and involves a different kind of 
processing (Green & Brock, 2000). Whereas ELM 
emphasizes relevance or involvement with respect 
to the message topic, narrative processes empha-
size the degree of identification with the characters, 
referred as absorp tion or tramportation (Slater & 
Rauner, 2002) . This transportation, induced by a 
compelling narrative, is supposed to inhibit coun-
terarguing and increase cognitive rehearsal and 
recall, thereby maximizing persuasion and behavior 
change (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007). 
In one representative study (McQueen, Kreuter, 
Kalesan, & Alcaraz, 2011), low-income African 
American women were assigned to watch a narrative 
video featuring stories from African American breast 
cancer survivors or a content-equivalent informa-
tional video about mammography. Responses were 
collected immediately, at 3- and 6-months. Women 
who watched the narrative video reported being 
more engaged, and reported more positive affect and 
less counterarguing with the appeal to seek mam-
mograms versus those women watching the exposi-
tory video. No evidence was reported about later 
screening although the narrative message was asso-
ci::ited with behavioral correlates of screening. Two 
other studies testing the effects of narrative commu-
nication have found subsequent effects on behav-
io r, such as blood pressure control (Houston et al. , 
2011) and safety (Ricketts, Shanteau, McSpadden, 
& Fernandez-Medina, 2010). 
Our perspective about narrative communica-
tions is their persuasive power is based in part on 
joining persuasion and comparison processes. 
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To the extent a narrative persuasive appeal is able to 
prompt assimilation with the characters (potential 
proxies) then their arguments, experiences, opin-
ions, and behaviors must appear appropriate for 
the audience. This means it is essential to identify 
the target's attributes, which create an initial holis-
tic impression of similarity with the characters (in 
accord with SAM) and related attributes that give 
the targets confidence they can successfully imple-
ment the changes and experience positive health 
outcomes (in accord with the proxy model; Wheeler 
etal., 1997). 
High-Tailored Proxy Health 
Interventions 
Our final topic concerns novel interventions, 
for example for smoking cessation or diet pro-
grams that also include many of the kinds of 
information included in one-shot health commu-
nications (Strecher et al., 2008; see also Alexander 
et al., 2010). The novel elements involve testing a 
low-tailored versus a high-tailored smoker's story 
about successfully quitting plus intervention com-
ponents of cognitive-behavioral therapy. In our 
terms, such an intervention attempts to maximize 
the engagement of social comparison and persua-
sion processes to create behavior change. 
In this multifactor study (Strecher et al., 
2008), smokers enrolled in two HMOs, who 
were considering quitting, received access to a free 
smoking-cessation program delivered via the web 
and a free supply of nicotine replacement patches. 
At the start, particip_ants completed a baseline ques-
tionnaire about smoking history, demographic, 
psychosocial and health characteristics (this infor-
mation was used to create the tailoring). Then, 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions 
that manipulated several factors in a fractional fac-
torial design (Collins, Murphy, Nair, & Strecher, 
2005). Participants assigned to the single exposure 
condition received all the information during one 
Internet session, whereas those assigned to mul-
tiple exposure received the same materials distrib-
uted over 5 weeks. High-depth outcome expectatiom 
participants received advice and feedback related 
to their specific motives reported for wanting to 
quit in the baseline questionnaire; low-depth par-
ticipants received feedback relating to their motives, 
but the program did not make as many connec-
tions to their current health or lifestyles. Smokers 
assigned to high-depth efficacy expectations received 
information to cope with their (reported in the 
survey) two most problematic barriers to quitting, 
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whereas low-depth parnc1pants received content 
about barriers that was framed in broader terms. 
The success stories, including a profile of a success-
ful quitter, also were manipulated in terms of depth. 
The high-depth participants received a story about 
someone of the same gender, age, ethnicity, mari-
tal status, which also included matching outcome 
and efficacy expectations. In contrast, the low depth 
participants only shared gender with the person in 
the narrative. Participants were contacted via tele-
phone six months postquit date and completed a 
7-day assessment of smoking abstinence. 
Abstinence was strongly related to receipt of a 
high-depth success story. In fact, the combination 
of highest tailored intervention components yielded 
a mean quit rate of about 39%, which for a low-cost, 
minimal contact, population-based intervention 
is impressive (Lancaster & Stead, 1998). A single 
exposure was as effective as multiple exposures. 
Interestingly, depth of outcome or efficacy expecta-
tions presented in a conventional, advice style was 
not associated with smoking cessation, whereas this 
same information embedded in the success story 
framework was effective. As Strecher et al. (2008) 
observe, " ... how you say it and who says it are at 
least as important as what you say" (p. 380). 
The present authors, however, would take this fur-
ther. The "how," "who," and "what" in this creative 
and efficacious intervention produced meaningful 
behavior change because a proxy was presented who 
shared personal characteristics, opinions, experiences, 
. and related attributes in connection with smoking 
and who modeled successful health behavior change. 
The similarities in personal characteristics should 
have facilitated identification/assimilation and the 
matching of related attributes should have made the 
role model's success seem like an appropriate and 
approachable goal for oneself (Wheeler & Suls, 2005). 
Concurrently, the content and arguments conveyed 
through a story should have reduced counterargu-
ing (based on narrative theory). This approach has 
considerable potential. Future study and implemen-
tation is needed to test the reach and effectiveness of 
such combined health communication-intervention 
efforts using the Internet as a platform. 
Conclusions 
Since the early 1950s, health communications 
have been systematically tested and implemented 
using several different modalities. This chapter 
presented a selective review of those aspects of 
health-communication campaigns that capital· 
ize on social comparison and persuasion processes 
clucidaced by basic researd1. For both rypcs of 
rocesses, engagement of the core elemencs of che 
~elf-sysrem eerns esscncial ro understand copi ng, 
opinion, belief, and behavior. Persua ion theories 
emphasize che role of personal relevance and the elf 
in acrive cognicivc processing of persuasive appeals 
LO produce meaningful behavior change. Wirh chat 
recogni rion, persuasion theory has inspired research 
on rhe effects of self-affirmation, fram ing, and fear. 
Compari on theory has motivated the develop-
lJlent of programs to correct perceptions of social 
norms, identified how people use comparison to 
cv~luare their relative standing, to assess what they 
can accomplish, to manage threat, and to utilize 
information about better- and worse-off persons 
or groups. Experr in health communications al o 
have incorporaced the findings and insights of 
this research with audiovisual materials, and social 
·upport group designed for Internet use. Finally, 
the newest generation of health communication 
involves an integration of advances in persua$ion 
(e.g., narrative theory), comparison (e.g., match-
ing of personal attributes to facilitate assimilation) 
and clinical intervention practices, such as cognitive 
behavior therapy to achieve health benefits. 
If the past is any indication, as persuasion and 
comparison theory/research continues to extend and 
refine its insights and strategies, health communica-
tion researchers and practitioners will import them 
to advance the public health. What is learned from 
implementation in the field will provide feedback 
and, no doubt, present surprising findings, as input 
for basic researchers (Suls, Luger, & Martin, 2010; 
Cialclini, 1980). So the scientific cycle will continue 
from "bench to bedside" and from "bedside (and 
community) to bench"-a dynamic, recursive loop. 
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